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Introduction 
Congressional staffs are seen as a valuable tool by Members of Congress. In fact, 
according to ballotpedia.com, the average MC spends $954,912 on staff annually. They 
are known to have a positive effect on an MC’s public image and may indirectly affect 
electoral races. With these effects in mind how does a MC decide to allocate his/her 
staff? Does she/he send more staff to D.C. to get work done on bills and legislation? Does 
he/she stockpile staff members in the district office to do casework and present a positive 
image to the community? What other factors cause a MC to make decisions on staff 
allocation? These decisions are crucial for an MC looking to maximize the effect of his or 
her staff. MCs understand how important an effective staff can be, and they must choose 
strategically how to place their staff. I contend that placement of congressional staff is 
about the goals of the MC. Allocation of the staff is dependent on a number of factors 
that are unique to each MC. 
 Scholars have shown congressional staffers are not just pencil pushers, but rather 
they play a vital role for a MC. Casework done by staffers can have a positive effect on 
the constituent’s image of the MC. According to study by Cover and Serra (1992), if the 
casework is done properly constituents tend to have a more favorable view of the MC, 
which may help in elections. By hiring more staff at home MCs can positively affect the 
way they are viewed by the community. Although all MCs want to be viewed favorably 
by their constituents, some MCs may need this benefit more than others. In this paper I 
address which factors lead MCs to put a larger proportion of their staff in the district 
office. This is significant because it can be used to help MCs make decisions on staff 
allocation. If an MC’s primary goal is get work done in the district compared to work in 
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Washington, conceivably an MC would put more staff in the district office. It is 
important to note congressional staffs are constrained by Member Representational 
Allowances (MRA). An MRA sets a limit on how much money can be spent by an MC 
on his or staff. In 2011 the MRA ranged from $1.3 – 1.9 million depending on the MC. 
So MCs have an overall budget, and must decide where to put and how much to spend on 
their staff within the limits of their budget. 
 I explore the number of different factors that play a role in staff allocation. Some 
MCs may place more of an emphasis on their home district for a number of reasons, and 
decide to place a majority of their staff in a district office. Other MCs may have different 
variables influencing them that lead to them placing more money and staff in a DC office. 
I argue close elections and heterogeneous districts lead MCs to place more staff in the 
district because these MCs are worried about their image in their district. For instance, I 
expect that if an MC had just run in a tight primary or general election, he or she will 
choose to send more staff to the district in hopes of boosting his or her image for the next 
election. Likewise if they are facing a close election in the near future they will also send 
more staff to the district for the same reasons. Also if a district is heterogeneous, MCs 
will be more likely to keep a large contingent of staff in the district so they can keep the 
support of their constituents. I also expect to find seniority and number of cosponsorships 
have a negative impact on staff allocation. For example I imagine if a MC has served 
many terms in office he/she is less worried about his image in the district, and more 
concerned about getting work done in Washington. Likewise, MCs who have a large 
number of staffers in D.C. may choose to focus more on their D.C. office and likely value 
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getting work done in D.C. (bill introductions) over presenting a positive public image in 
their district.  
 Finding the factors that cause MCs to allocate more staff in the district allows me 
to answer important questions about the value of congressional staffs and their MCs. It 
will allow me to present, which factors cause an MC to worry more about their district 
than the work they are doing in D.C. It will also show that MCs may be able to use staffs 
to their advantage, and how MCs should allocate their staff to maximize this advantage. It 
will also reveal that different MCs have different needs, and the congressional staff can 
be used to fit those needs. 
 My analysis of congressional staffs focuses on the 104th to the 110th Congresses 
(1995-2008). In this dataset there are 3094 MC observations. I will study such factors as 
staff allocation proportions, seniority, number of cosponsorships, closeness of elections, 
heterogeneity of the district, district location, party majority . I hope to find which 
variables have a strong influence on staff allocation. 
Literature Review 
Scholars have long recognized the important role played by congressional staff. 
One area of scholarly work looks at the importance of congressional staff, especially 
regarding casework. Casework is help provided to constituents in a number of fields by 
an MC’s staff. It usually deals with issues the constituent is having with the federal 
government such as passport or visa issues. Another area that has been looked at is the 
resource allocation of an MC. Resource allocation is the process of how an MC decides 
where and by what means to spend his/her MRA. These areas of the literature will be 
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discussed throughout the lit review. First I will explain the importance of congressional 
staffs and casework. 
Positive Effects of Congressional Staff 
 Picking a staff is not something MCs do on a whim. They must weigh the 
different effects a staff can have on their image and goals. How helpful can staffers be in 
different offices? They must try and quantify how much an effect the district and DC 
staff will have on their goals and constituents. The research shows that in fact staff can be 
influential, and can play an important role to the MC. 
Importance of Staff 
Price (1971) looked at the importance of staff but he limited his scope to their 
influence in Congressional policy making. He found that a well-organized and informed 
staff is essential for policy making in Congress. He wrote that for staffer to assist with 
policy needs he/she needs to have a strong sense of knowledge in the area. This means 
for staffers to be effective they must have a strong grasp of the information they are 
dealing with. Someone with no experience cannot be expected to achieve the positive 
effects of a seasoned staffer. This study was helpful in showing that staffs are not just 
there to do busy work but rather can have a real effect on policy.  
Another study that showed staffs are not just paper pushers was the study by 
Romzek and Utter (1997). The authors asked if congressional staffers should be viewed 
as mere clerks or professionals. The authors found through a series of interviews that 
staffs posses the typical characteristics of professionals. According to the authors typical 
professionals can be defined as “individuals who have a special form of "tacit" 
knowledge and expertise in political technology which transcend departments and party 
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lines” (p 1251).  An average congressional staffer possesses important knowledge and 
has the ability to get things done. This shows that staffs are able to provide real services 
to the constituents of a district. One way a staff can be do this is through casework. 
Casework 
 Casework is an important part of a staffer’s job and a lot of research has been 
dedicated to the effects of it. Although not all staffers do casework, it is an important part 
of the work handled by each district staff. Scholars have explored the effect of staff 
casework on legislators’ reputations and electoral prospects. The study done by Cover 
and Serra (1992) investigated the impact of casework on the incumbent’s recognition and 
popularity with the voters in the district. They found that effective casework boosts both 
the recognition and popularity of the MC. They concluded casework has an effect on 
elections, but that it holds a much greater weight in districts where the number of 
constituents who identity with the MCs’ party is small. 
Another study done by Moon and Serra (1994) focused on whether service or 
policy responsiveness played the most important role in elections. The authors found that 
both types of responsiveness matter. This finding is significant to my paper because 
congressional staffers conduct both service and policy responsiveness. This means 
staffers play a role in elections because they play a part in both types of responsiveness. 
Romero (1996) also looked at the impact casework had on constituents. He was 
looking to see how incumbent helpfulness, which mainly includes casework done by the 
staff, left an impression on members of the district after controlling for a rationalization 
effect. According to Romero rationalization effect is the theory that “voters have 
favorable assessments of their incumbents because they intend to support them in the 
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upcoming election” (p 1198).  He controlled for this effect because one criticism is that 
constituents already have a positive view of their representative before they use them for 
casework and therefore are not affected by the casework. While controlling for this 
effect, Romero found that incumbent helpfulness still left a positive impression on 
constituents. This showed that district staffs do have a positive influence on the MC’s 
constituents by the services they provide. 
Another criticism of casework is that it only reaches a few members of the district 
and has a marginal effect. Serra (1994) conducted a study to find out how casework 
affected a constituent’s evaluation of the incumbent. In the study he found that casework 
does have a positive impact on the evaluation process and that although the casework 
may only reach a small number of constituents it has an electoral influence. This study 
rebutted the argument that casework has little positive effects. 
 These findings show that the casework done by congressional staffs are useful and 
can have a direct effect on constituents. They have a significant influence on the way an 
MC is viewed by his/her district. When MCs see this research they can know that their 
staff allocation decisions in the district will have a positive effect, and they will come to 
understand the importance of this effect. Staffers do casework that has this positive effect 
on legislators; thus MCs’ decisions about resource allocation to devote to such efforts 
also plays a role in their success. 
Resource Allocation 
 Resource allocation is the process of how an MC decides to split up the resources 
available to him or her. A number of scholars have explored the effects of allocation. It is 
important to MCs because they are only allowed a certain number of resources, and they 
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must effectively decide how to divide them. One of these resources they must allocate is 
their staff. They are constrained by the MRA on how much they can spend on staff so it 
is paramount they know the effects of allocation, and what the effects are of how they 
allocate their resources.  
Ornstein (1975), for example, finds that Senators with bigger staffs cosponsored 
the highest number of bills. It is hard to prove though that the two are causally related 
because a bigger staff does not automatically mean an MC will cosponsor more bills. 
There are a number of different factors that affect cosponsorship, and just the fact of 
having a large staff does not lead to more cosponsorships. It does show insight though 
that congressional staff in Washington may play a role in helping bill sponsorship and 
introduction, which can help further the success of an MC.  
Goodman and Parker (2009) also studied resource allocation, exploring how it 
affected constituent views. The authors found that franking, office expenditures, and 
travel back home had a positive impact on the way constituents viewed their 
representative. This shows that voters can be swayed by how many resources an MC 
allocates to their home district. Part of resource allocation includes district staff and the 
work they do. In turn a voter may view an MC more positively if they have a larger staff 
at home.  
In another study conducted by Parker and Goodman (2013), the authors build on 
their initial conclusions to investigate how the payoffs of allocation differ between MCs. 
They found more allocation to the district positively affected Members of the House the 
most because they do not have to cater to such a diverse population as a senator does. 
They also found allocation to the district had a more positive effect on MCs serving in 
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rural areas compared to more urban areas. Although MCs had different levels of impact 
depending on their district they all were still positively affected by allocating resources to 
their home district, which includes congressional staffs. 
Johannes and McAdams (1985) also investigate the relationship between MCs 
and their constituents. They found MCs increase the level of attentiveness to their home 
district for factors relating to national electoral tides, district partisan strength, challenger 
quality, and incumbents' ideological and partisan compatibility. They also found that each 
MCs’ behavior was distinctive and no regular patterned developed across MCs in relation 
to attentiveness levels.  
Goodman and Parker (2010) also looked at the motives of MCs in regard to 
allocation of resources at home. They found that a re-election motive is not the sole 
reason for a MC to increase their resource allocation to home. An increase in the 
resources to the home district is used to support whatever an MC’s representational goals 
are.  
 These studies demonstrate that resource allocation matters both to MCs and their 
constituents. Allocation of resources to the home district can definitely have a positive 
impact for the representative although the goals may not always be electoral goals. By 
hiring more staff at home an MC is likely to be viewed much more positively by his or 
her constituents. Most MCs know of this positive effect and will try to use it to their 
advantage. What I am looking to understand is which factors indicate that an MC may try 
to take advantage of this influence.   
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Opposing Views 
 However, other scholars argue that the casework done by staffers does not have 
an effect on an MC. Johannes and McAdams (1988) studied how reliable the 
“perquisite/constituency service” hypothesis is. This hypothesis states that MCs have a 
better chance at reelection if they use the power of the office and effectively manage 
casework. The authors found that individual casework experience did not affect voters’ 
decisions. There were a number of other factors that affected a voter’s decision to vote 
for a candidate, while casework had little effect on voter preference.  In another study 
conducted by Johannes and McAdams (1987), the authors looked at the relationship 
between MCs’ vote shares and their level of casework. They found that increased 
casework had a minimal effect on electoral success. Although that is possible, there are 
more and newer studies that support the idea that casework has a positive impact. Recent 
studies on resource allocation and casework in general show that both can have positive 
effects in regard to elections and an MC’s reputation.  
Research Design 
 There are multiple hypotheses I will be testing using the data from the 104th to the 
110th Congress. This covers the years from 1994-2008. This time span is sufficient 
because it allows me enough information to see the impact congressional staffs have on 
MCs. It should allow for any inconsistencies in the data to be controlled for that would be 
seen in a smaller sample. 
The hypotheses are: 1) The more senior an MC is, the less amount of staff he or 
she will have in the district, 2) As party heterogeneity in an MC’s district increases, so 
will the MC’s proportion of staff in the district, 3A) As voting margin in the previous 
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general election decreases, the proportion of staff in the district will increase 4) As bill 
introduction increases for an MC, the proportion of staff in the district will decrease, 5) 
MC’s who are not affiliated with the party of the majority of their constituents will have 
higher proportions of staff in the district office compared to MCs who are the same party 
as the majority of their district, and 6) When a new MC is elected to Congress, he/she 
will have a larger proportion in his/her district staff. 7) The more miles an MC’s office is 
from D.C., the more district staff an MC will have. 8) If an MC’s party holds the majority 
in Congress, he/she will have more staff in the district offices. 
 In all of these hypotheses I will be using a large-N statistical analysis .The 
primary dependent variable is the proportion of staff in an MC’s district office. This is 
measured by dividing the number of staffers in district offices from the total number of 
staffers an MC has. The independent variable changes with each test. 
 The independent variable in the first hypothesis is seniority. This can be measured 
by how many years an MC has been in office. A more senior MC will have less staffers 
because they are probably in a secure district, and do not have to worry about their 
constituents as much as a newer MC. 
 In the second hypothesis party heterogeneity in the district is the independent 
variable. This can be measured as the proportion of Republicans or Democrats within the 
district because they are the only two major parties. A district with a proportion of both 
parties close to half is more heterogeneous than a district where one party has a large 
proportion. An MC who has a heterogeneous district is likely to put more staff in the 
district because they have to please the needs of constituents from both parties. 
 12 
 In hypothesis three the independent variable is voting margin. Voting margin can 
be measured by the margin of votes the MC had over the leading challenger. If the 
election was close in the previous election an MC will realize he or she needs to focus on 
his or her home district more, and therefor will put more staff in the district offices. 
 The independent variable in the fourth hypothesis is bill introduction. Bill 
introduction can be measured by the number of times an MC introduces a bill in each 
session. MCs who introduce more bills will probably focus their staff on their DC offices 
compared to the district ones. 
 In the fifth hypothesis the independent variable is the measure of the party 
majority of the district in line with the party of the MC. This can be measured as by a 
dichotomous 0-1 variable where 0 means the parties are not aligned and 1 means they are. 
MCs with similar parties to the majority have less to be concerned about in their home 
district and therefor will put less staff in the district offices. 
 New MCs is the independent variable in the sixth hypothesis. This is measured 
using by a dichotomous 0-1 variable where 0 means the MC is not new and 1 means they 
are. New MCs are susceptible to losing the next election because their constituents do not 
have a good understanding of who they are. By putting more staff in the district an MC 
can build stronger ties with his/her new district. 
 In the seventh hypothesis the independent variable is miles. Miles is a measure of 
how far in miles the MC’s office is from D.C. MCs far from D.C. will have more district 
staff because they do not have the option of using staff in both the district and D.C. 
offices. Also MCs who are far away may not be as concerned with getting things done in 
D.C. as other MCs because of the cost to travel back and forth. 
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 Lastly, party majority in Congress is the independent variable of the eighth 
hypothesis. MCs who are part of the party that holds the majority in Congress will not 
have to work as hard to get things done in D.C. Therefor they will transfer more 
resources to their district offices. 
 To test these hypotheses I will be using the program STATA. These hypotheses 
can be tested using a regression analysis. I will conduct multiple regressions using the 
other variables from the hypotheses to control. Also I will be using a p value of .05 to 
discover statistical significance. Anything below .05 will be determined statistically 
significant. 
Data 
My data includes 3,001 observations relating to MCs district and D.C. staff 
numbers during the 104th to the 110th Congresses. Figure 1 presents the average percent 
of district and Washington D.C. staffer each Congress had. This was calculated by 
finding the percentage of district staffers each MC of each individual Congress had. The 
average MC allocated 47.37% of his/her staff to his/her district office with a range from 
46.26% to 48.05%. (52.63% was allocated to the D.C. office on average). 
Figure 1: Average Percent of District Staffers 
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Figure 1 presents the average percentage of staffers working for a Member of United 
States House of Representative’s district and Washington D.C. offices in the 104th-110th 
Congresses.  
 
In addition to breaking down the staffers into percent, I also broke down the 
average for each Congress by each number of individual staffers an MC has as shown by 
Table 1. This was done to give the reader an idea of on average how many staffers a MC 
employs in each of his/her offices. When I first saw these numbers I was surprised to see 
how few staffers each MC has. I thought the MC would have a large team of staffers 
doing work for him/her, but rather it seems as if each MC has a handful of trusted staffers 
to get the job done. The average for the 104th to the 110th was 7.40 staffers in the district 
office per MC with a range from zero staffers to seventeen. The average for D.C staffers 
was 7.98 and the range was two to fourteen. 
Table 1 Number of Staffers in District and D.C. Offices 
Congress Avg. Dist Staff Dist Staff Range  Avg. D.C. Staff 
D.C. Staff 
Range 
104th 7.14 (0,14) 8.09 (3,14) 
105th 7.21 (0,14) 7.88 (2,13) 
106th 7.38 (1,14) 8.02 (5,12) 
107th 7.43 (1,16) 8.04 (3,12) 
108th 7.72 (1,17) 8.17 (4,13) 
109th 7.58 (1,14) 7.97 (3,13) 
110th 7.33 (0,14) 7.71 (3,13) 
Table 1 provides information about the average number of staffers an MC had in each 
office. District and D.C. staffs are the amount of staffers working in each office. The table 
also provides the minimum and maximum of staffers working in each office for each 
Congress.  
 
There was also quite a variation between each MC’s district staff makeup. In the 
104th-110th Congresses, MCs in the 25th percentile had 41.7% of their staff in the district 
offices compared to MCs in the 75th percentile that had 53.3% of their staff in the district 
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offices. The smallest percentage was 0% in the district offices while the largest was 
77.8%. The standard deviation was 9.5%. All this information shows how large the gap 
for district staff percentages were between MCs. With this much variance between MCs 
it is important to look at what are the variables behind this gap.  
Both Table 1 and Figure 1 show that on average an MC has more staffers working 
in his/her D.C. office. This came as a surprise to me because throughout my research it 
was shown that district staffers could have quite the positive influence for an MC. I 
expected MCs to apply this research by staffer their district offices more heavily than 
their D.C. offices. It may be the case though some MCs put their more experienced 
staffers in their district offices and therefore do not feel the need to heavily staff those 
offices, but that would be for a different study. Overall I was surprised to see the D.C. 
offices having more staff.  
Another important part of the data set is the independent variable. In Table 2 the 
averages and range of each variable are shown. This helps to gain an understanding for 
each of the variables. I included the ranges for each of the variables to show at times how 
drastic the maximums and minimums can be. But in those cases the outliers did not have 
an effect on the mean because of how large each sample was. In this study there are the 
nine main independent variables, while the rest of the variables in the table were used as 
control variables. I chose each of these variables because I believe all of them in some 
way have an effect on an MC’s decision in regards to staffing. Most of them are related to 
the type of district the MC represents or elections. Hopefully these variables will help 
control for different types of district makeup while also helping to control for differences 
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in different MCs level of funding. The time period for these variables also spans from the 
104th to the 110th Congresses.  
 
 
Table 2 Independent Variables 
Independent Variable Mean Range 
Miles 1099.82 miles (7, 4825) 
Seniority 8.82 years (0, 51) 
Vote Share 70.26% (50, 100) 
Total Intros 12.74 bills (0, 119) 
New 13.93% (0, 1) 
Primary Challenge 29.48% (0, 1) 
In Majority 52.71% (0,1) 
Rural Percentage 21.04% (0, .79) 
Number of District Offices 2.14 offices (1, 7) 
District Ideology 57.79% (0, 1) 
District Heterogeneity -.004 (-3.43, 2.28) 
Poverty Percentage 12.56% (.03, .66) 
White Percentage 68.94% (.01, .97) 
Black Percentage 12.53% (0, .79) 
Asian Percentage 3.69% (0, .54) 
Latino Percentage 12.57% (.01, .90) 
Amount Spent in Last Election $848,955.20 (0, 8,100,000) 
Money Received in Last Election $917,819.10 (0, 8,100,000) 
Present to Vote Percentage 95.49% (0, 100) 
Table 2 provides information about the average for each independent variable. The 
average found for each independent variable is the mean of the measure from the 104th to 
the 110th Congress. 
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Results and Findings 
 I have hypothesized about nine different variables affecting the proportion of 
staffer an MC puts in the district. To measure the effect of these variables I ran a multiple 
regression analysis in Stata along with 12 other control variables. These variables 
controlled for things such as ethnic makeup of the district, urban/rural location, poverty 
levels, and other similar variables in regards to money and district makeup. The results of 
these multiple regressions are shown below in Table 3. The percentage of district staff is 
the dependent variable while the nine main independent and twelve control variables are 
shown throughout the table. The timeline of these multiple regressions encompasses all 
the MCs and their staff from the 104th to the 110th Congresses. 
Table 3 Explaining District Staff Makeup 
Variable   District Staff % 
Miles -.001(.001)** 
Seniority -.102(.005)** 
Vote Share -.031(.090) 
Total Intros .031(.426) 
New -3.540(.000)** 
Primary Challenge .950(.030)* 
In Majority -1.243(.014)* 
Rural % 
# Of District Offices 
District Ideology 
District Heterogeneity 
Poverty %                                      
White % 
Black % 
Asian % 
Latino % 
-.031(.115) 
1.583(.000)** 
-.150(.721) 
1.293(.420) 
.242(.001)** 
.019(.749) 
.018(.766) 
-.025(.801) 
     .021(.711) 
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Amount Spent in Election 
Donations 
Present to Vote 
-.001(.456) 
-.001(.961) 
-.001(.015)* 
N               3001 
Pseudo R2                      .110 
Note: The table presents the results of a multiple regression analysis where the 
dependent variable is the percentage of staffers an MC puts in the district offices. District 
Staff Percentage is represented as the correlation coefficient followed by the standard 
error in parentheses. N is the number of observations included in the analysis. *=p<.05; 
**=p<.01. 
  
Seniority 
Starting with the first hypothesis I hypothesized that the more senior an MC is the 
less staff he/she will have. Looking at the regression analysis, as seniority increases by 
one, the district staff percentage decreases by -.102 (p < .01). This was consistent with 
my original hypothesis. I believe this happens because as an MC gains seniority he/she is 
not as susceptible to a loss in an election. The more seniority an MC gains the more 
ingrained he/she becomes in the district. It is hard to unseat a long sitting incumbent. 
Because of this I believe an MC loses the incentive to pack his/her district offices with 
staffers. They do not need the advantages a district staff can bring in terms of recognition 
and popularity with the community because they usually have no trouble winning 
reelection. This in turn may cause the MC to focus more on getting things done in D.C., 
which would lead to a transfer of resources and staffers to the D.C. offices.  
Another explanation is that once an MC feels safe in his/her seat the MC may 
decide to spend less on staff in general. They may not need as many staffers to get things 
done because they have built a plethora of connections during their time in Congress to 
help them accomplish the goals they set out to complete. Also an MC may find a small 
group of experienced staffers who do their jobs quite effectively and therefore does not 
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need to be constantly hiring or adding on new staffers. These longtime staffers would be 
loyal to the office, which would lead to less turnover and would eliminate the need for a 
constant change and hiring in the office. Overall it appears the older and more tenured an 
MC becomes, the less need or want an MC has for staff, which leads to a decrease in 
his/her district office staffers. 
District Heterogeneity 
 Another hypothesis that was supported by the data was my second hypothesis. 
This hypothesis stated that as a district’s party heterogeneity increased, so would the 
percentage of district staffer. Referring to the regressions, as heterogeneity increased by a 
unit so did the district staff percentage by 1.29 (p > .05).  
I believe this is a result of MCs trying to appease a changing home district. When 
a district’s party heterogeneity is increasing, it means the district is becoming more 
polarized in regards to the political parties. This is usually not a good thing for an 
incumbent because this means an increase in voters from the opposing party. So it is 
possible in response to this increase from opposing party voters, MCs may decide to 
increase their district staffs. They would do this because they realize they need to 
strengthen their relationship with the voters in their district.  
One way to do this is to increase the staff and workload in the district offices so 
the MC may be able to reap the rewards of such an increase and ride those rewards to 
reelection. By doing this, an MC is attempting to quell the wave of opposite party voters. 
The MC wants to win reelection and if the voting base is not as strong in years past the 
MC is going to have to strengthen his/her popularity with the existing voters of the same 
party. Increasing services and staff supplied by the district offices can do just that. MCs 
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are rational people who usually have a goal of winning the next election in mind. They 
understand the positive effects an increase in the district staff can have and therefore use 
this knowledge to help them achieve their goal. 
Vote Share 
 As usual the goal is to win reelection for an MC. One way to see if the goal was 
achieved is through vote share. In the hypotheses regarding vote share I surmised that as 
vote share decreased in the previous general election, the percentage of district staff 
would increase. Looking at the regressions it can be seen the hypothesis was supported. 
As the vote share in the previous general election decreased by one percent the district 
staff increased by .03 (p > .05). 
 Although this result was not statistically significant I still think there is reasoning 
behind the results. It is easy to explain why the previous vote share and district staff 
percentage have an inverse relationship. This is because as the previous voting margin 
decreases for MCs, they know that their seat in Congress may not be as secure as they 
thought. They know that if the voting margin, and therefore their vote share, was small 
they need to increase their support in the district. Again according to the literature, this 
can be done through an increase in the district staff and the work they do with the 
community. The more staff an MC puts in the district, the more people his or her staff 
can reach. This large reach of the staff can help project a positive image of the MC and 
his or her office onto the constituents and this projection may be able to help increase 
vote share in future elections.   It is the smart move by MCs to increase district staff if 
they feel their seat is in jeopardy. 
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Total Intros 
 Another subject that may lead to a decrease in staff in the total number of bills 
introduced by an MC. In my fourth hypothesis I predicated the total number of bill 
introductions an MC had would have an inverse relationship with the district staff 
percentage. Looking at the regressions it can be seen that the data contradicts my 
hypothesis. In fact on average for every one bill introduced by an MC, his/her district 
staff percentage went up .031 (p > .05). I made my hypothesis on the idea that if an MC 
has a large number of bills introduced, he/she will be busy getting things done in D.C. 
His/her main focus would probably be on Congress and the D.C. office compared to 
his/her home district. And because his/her focus was away from the home district, he/she 
would probably have a bigger staff in the D.C. office to help him/her accomplish his/her 
goals. 
 According to the data it is the opposite and the more bills an MC passes, the 
higher his/her district staff percentage is. One explanation for this is if MCs are active in 
introducing bills, they may need to have large staffs in general. It may be that the work 
needed to be done to introduce bills is not exclusive to the D.C. office, and the district 
may help with some of this work. Theses MCs may hire a large amount of inexperienced 
staffers rather than a small amount of experienced staffers because they need a lot of 
work done to introduce their bills. They may not feel it is important to provide constituent 
services to the district and therefore may just hire staffers to get the work done on bills 
rather than reaching out to the community with constituent services.  
 Another explanation may be if MCs are busy introducing bills and speaking in 
Congress they do not have as much time to travel back to their home districts and meet 
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with the constituents. This would lead them to putting an increased number of staffers in 
the district offices to do the work of the absent MC. For example an MC may not be able 
to attend the various events going on in his/her home district because of the time it is 
necessary to spend in D.C. to introduce a bill. So instead, a staffer is sent out to fill in for 
the busy MC.  
Also MCs may be increasing the district staff to appease their constituents. The 
constituents may realize the MC is not as visible in the community as they like because 
he/she is busy getting work on bills in D.C. This would in turn lead to the MC increasing 
staff in the district office to help increase the favorability of the MC with the voters. The 
increased staff would be able to provide increased constituent services to help satisfy the 
constituents. 
District Ideology 
 The constituent ideology of a district also plays a role in the staffing decisions of 
an MC. The hypothesis states if district ideology increases towards the ideology of the 
incumbent, the district staff will decrease. According to the data for every unit the district 
ideology increases, the district staff percentage decreases by .15 (p > .05). The reasoning 
behind the hypothesis was if an MC’s district shifts towards the ideology of the MC, the 
MC does not have to put as many offices in district. If the district is already in line with 
the MC’s ideology the constituents will probably reelect the MC because they agree with 
his/her views. Because of this the MC does need to shift resources to the district offices 
and increase staff because he/ she does not need the benefits of increasing casework in 
the district. 
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 Looking at the data supports this reasoning. It makes sense that an MC would 
have less district staff when his or her constituents are in line ideologically with him or 
her. The resources used to pay and maintain district staff could be better off elsewhere 
because there is no need to increase support. The district is most likely to reelect the MC 
because they have similar views. The only caveat to this is that it may leave the 
incumbent open to a primary challenge. If the district is leaning mostly towards one 
ideology then it may become open for a primary challenge from someone from the same 
party as the current MC. In these instances it may be wise of the MC to increase the 
district staff to rally support in the district. 
New MC 
 Constituent support is also important for new MCs. It is important they get off on 
the right foot and sustain the support of the district that got them elected. The hypothesis 
in regards to new MCs states these new members will have a higher proportion of district 
staffers compared to the other MCs. Looking at the data new MCs actually have 3.54 
percent less staffers in the district offices compared to the other MCs (p < .01). In reality 
according to the data new MCs seem to care less about staffing the district office than the 
other MCs do. 
 One reason for this finding may be new MCs are riding their wave of reelection 
support and therefore do not feel the need for a district staff. These MCs would have just 
spent a lot of money and time in the district and they may feel that was enough to provide 
them the support they need for the time being. With all the money that was spent of the 
election in the district they may feel the resources they have now could be better spent 
elsewhere. 
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 Along these lines the new MCs may feel the need to now divert more of their time 
and resources to D.C. Coming off an election new MCs would have a lot of campaign 
promises to fulfill and they may divert their resources away from the district offices to 
help accomplish those promises. They would not be afraid to shrink the resources sent to 
the district because they know they have the support of the district following the recent 
election. Also, since they are new MCs they may feel the need to bulk up their DC offices 
to get work done. These new MCs are eager to get things done and have bills passed in 
Washington as they begin their first term in office. But because they are inexperienced 
and lack the connections of older MCs, new MCs may increase their staff in the D.C. 
office to help combat these problems. This could also lead to a decrease in the district 
staff percentage. 
Miles 
 Another reason a district staff may decrease is due to the proximity of the MC’s 
district to D.C. The hypothesis in regards to miles an MC is away from Washington 
asserts the more miles an MC’s office is from D.C., the more district staff an MC will 
have. The data and the regressions show for every mile an MC’s district is away from 
D.C., an MC’s district staff will decrease by .001 percent (p < .01). This finding opposes 
my original hypothesis that miles and district staff percent were positively correlated. My 
reasoning behind the hypothesis was the farther an MC’s district is away from D.C. the 
less he/she could use both offices for dual purposes. In other words I reasoned MCs 
closer to DC would be able to use the district offices for both district and federal matters 
because it would be easy to travel in between both. 
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 After running the data I understand why the numbers did not support the 
hypothesis. One possible explanation is MCs who travel a lot do not have as many 
resources in general. MCs who are farther away travel much more than MCs who are 
closer to Washington and therefore are forced to spend a larger amount of their resources 
on travel. This could possibly lead to a decrease in staff overall. Also, because of all this 
traveling MCs may prefer to have smaller offices with a few trusted employees. They 
may not be there a lot to oversee everything and do not want too many staffers in the 
district office with little supervision. 
 Along the same lines of traveling, an MC whose district is far from D.C. may not 
travel to D.C. as much because of how expensive it is. This could lead to MCs spending 
more time in the district and increasing their popularity and image with their constituents. 
This in turn erases the need for the MCs to take advantage of large district staffs. There 
would be less of a need to provide casework for the constituents and the MCs resources 
could be better spent on travel or other needs. 
In majority  
 One last factor I hypothesized that could have affected district staff percentage 
was whether an MC’s party was in the majority. My hypothesis states if an MC’s party 
holds the majority in Congress, he/she will have more staff in the district offices. 
According to the data if an MC’s party is in the majority, his/her district staff will 
decrease by 1.24 percent (p < .05). My hypothesis is not supported by the data. I thought 
an MC whose party was in the majority would be less inclined to spend resources in the 
D.C. office because it would be easier to get legislation through. There would be less of a 
need for staff to do work on possible bills because being in the majority greatly helps the 
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process. Therefore I supposed the resources not being used in the Washington office 
would be moved to the district office which would lead to an increase in staff in the those 
offices.  
 In reality it seems MCs who are in the majority feel comfortable in the position 
they are in with regards to their home district. They may feel since the party they are in 
has the majority they do not need to focus as much on reelection. This would explain why 
they would not make use of the positive effects an increased district staff may have on 
elections. Instead, they may divert these resources elsewhere to help them accomplish 
other goals. Also, the MCs that are part of the party that are not in the majority may feel 
threatened in regards to reelection. This could lead to an increase in the district staff of 
these MCs as they try to gain support for the upcoming election and focus less on things 
in D.C. 
 One of the goals of the MCs who are part of the party in majority may be to pass 
more legislation. MCs who are the majority may feel it is a good time to start introducing 
legislation when their party is in control. They may want to put their name on legislation 
and show their district they are getting work done. This could lead to a possible increase 
in the Washington staff because the MC is trying to pass as many bills as possible. This 
would increase the workload in the Washington office and more resources would have to 
be used there. This would lead to a decrease of resources and staff used in the district 
offices. 
Control Variables 
 A majority of the variables I used in the analysis were used as control variables. 
Most of these control variables do not warrant a discussion in this study, but there are 
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four control variables that had a p < .01 that I wanted to discuss. These four variables are 
present vote percentage, number of district offices, poverty percent, and primary 
challenge. 
 According to the data the more district offices an MC has, the more district staff 
an MC will have. This is pretty self explanatory because the more offices there are the 
more staff there needs to be to fill those offices. This just shows that if an MC has a lot of 
district offices, he/she is very likely to have a big district staff. 
  Another control variable, present vote percentage, measures the percentage of 
time an MC is present to vote on legislation in Congress. Not surprisingly, according to 
the data the higher percentage an MC attends the vote, the lower percentage of district 
staff the MC possesses. This makes sense because an MC who attends a high percentage 
of the vote is probably focused on getting things done in D.C. and less concerned with 
his/her district. 
 The third control variable that was significant was poverty percent. The data 
showed as the percentage of people in poverty in a district increased, so did the district 
staff. This makes sense because people in poverty would tend to be in need of some type 
of government assistance. An MC’s district office is a great resource to turn to when 
dealing with aid from the federal government. The district staffers can help the 
constituents with forms and such things when they are applying for aid. The need for 
district staffers in wealthier areas then becomes less of priority because there are less 
people in need of aid from the government. 
 Lastly, the variable of primary challenge proved to be significant. If an MC had a 
primary challenge the district staff percentage went up .95. This also makes sense 
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because if an MC is in a primary battle, he or she needs the support of the constituents to 
win the primary. One way to gain this support is to increase the district staff, which in 
turn increases the services offered by the district offices. This effect may help the MC in 
his or her primary battle, especially if it is a closely contested election. 
Overall Findings 
 Overall, it appears miles, seniority, in majority, and new were the strongest 
indicators of whether an MC has a high percentage of his/her staff in the district. In 
accordance with my hypothesis, seniority and district staff percentage had an inverse 
relationship. The more senior an MC is the less district staff there would be in the district 
offices. 
The data did not support my hypotheses in regards to the variables miles, in 
majority, and new. In the case of all three variables, the variables had an inverse 
relationship with district staff percentage. So if any of the three variables increased the 
district staff percentage would decrease.  
 According to the data younger, but not new, MCs whose districts are closer to 
D.C. and are not in the majority would be most likely to have a large district staff. This 
information is helpful to understand for a range of reasons and can be used to influence 
future research. Below are figures of each of the main findings. 
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Figure 2 presents the findings for the variables of seniority, miles, new, and in majority 
during the 104th-110th Congresses. The findings of these four variables were all 
statistically significant. 
Conclusion 
 The main purpose of this study was to try and understand the variables causing 
the variance of district staff percentages between MCs. While most of the literature 
looked at the effects district staffs had on their MCs, few looked at this variance. I 
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hypothesized eight main variables would explain this variance. These variables were 
seniority, party heterogeneity, vote share, total intros, district ideology, new MC, miles, 
and in majority. 
 I used a multiple regression analysis to study the effect of these variables. 
Included in the regression were multiple control variables. I found that four of the 
original eight variables were statistically significant and had an effect on district staff 
percentages. The variables of seniority, miles, new, and in majority each had an inverse 
relationship with district staff percentages and only the seniority finding supported one of 
my hypotheses. 
 This study was conducted over the 104th to 110th Congresses so I do think these 
results can be generalized to the current Congress and beyond. I do think though that the 
effects of some of the variables will change over time.  As MCs become more informed 
about the effects of district staff they will use them even more strategically and I believe 
these variables will show more of an effect in future Congresses. 
 Some of the important takeaways from this study should be senior MCs most 
likely feel safe in their districts and therefore do not need the positive effects of a large 
district staff. MCs in the majority have large D.C. staffs because they may feel it is 
important to try and pass bills while they have the votes. MCs who are far away from 
D.C. may have less district staffers because they have to spend resources on travel. New 
MCs may have less staffers because they are trying to fulfill campaign promises in D.C. 
 I believe the data from this study is very sound. I did the best I could to measure 
each variable as best as possible with the limited resources I had. It would have been nice 
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to expand the study to include more Congresses but I am not sure if the data is there. I do 
believe the data still provides valuable information. 
 Future research should continue to explore the effects of district staff while also 
looking at other variables in the process. It is important to keep studying how much an 
effect district staffs can have on MCs because this research allows MCs to strategically 
place their staffs. It also allows them to understand how to best utilize their staffs and 
where they should be placing them. It would be nice to see continued research on how 
much an effect district staffs have on reelection since that is an important issue to MCs. If 
studies continue to show the importance of district staffs on reelection, it would help 
constituents and MCs alike see the value of district staffs. 
 I would also like to see how other variables play a role in district staff 
percentages. Do a staffers experience and/or salary affect the district staff percentages? 
For instance would an MC be more likely to have a small staff with more experienced, 
higher paid staffers, or bigger staffs with inexperienced, and cheap staffers? Which one is 
more effective? Unfortunately I was not able to obtain this type of data but in the future it 
would be an interesting topic to research. It would be especially interesting to MCs 
because they would be able to better spend their resources depending of which type of 
staff was more effective.  
 This study helped to explain some of the variance between MC’s district staffs. It 
did not explain all of it, but it was a good start. It was helpful in showing how staffs can 
be a valuable resource and MCs should use these staffs in strategic ways. The staffs can 
be of huge benefit to MCs. While most of the research focused on reelection as the 
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driving force behind district staff makeups, this study showed there are other variables 
that can be much more predictive.  
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